Abstract: Continuum hypothesis and ω-inconsistency of set theory are shown to be related.
We consider a formal set theory S, where we can develop a number theory. As no generality is lost, in the following we consider a number theory that can be regarded as a subsystem of S, and will call it S (0)
. Definition 1. 1) We assume that a Gödel numbering of the system S (0) is given, and denote a formula with the Gödel number n by A n . 2) A (0) (a, b) is a predicate meaning that "a is the Gödel number of a formula A with just one free variable (which we denote by A(a)), and b is the Gödel number of a proof of the formula A(a) in S (0) ." Here a denotes the formal natural number corresponding to an intuitive natural number a of the meta level.
Definition 2. Let P(x 1 , · · · .x n ) be an intuitive-theoretic predicate. We say that P(x 1 , · · · , x n ) is numeralwise expressible in the formal system S (0)
, if there is a formula P (x 1 , · · · , x n ) with no free variables other than the distinct variables x 1 , · · · , x n such that, for each particular n-tuple of natural numbers x 1 , · · · , x n , the following holds:
Here "true" means "provable on the meta level." Lemma 1. There is a Gödel numbering of the formal objects of the system S (0) such that the predicate A (0) (a, b) defined above is numeralwise expressible in S (0) with the associated formula
Definition 3. Let p (0) be the Gödel number of a formula:
Then we have In particular
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The numeralwise expressibility of
, we have obtained in a way similar to Gödel's incompleteness theorem ( [1] , see also [2] ) that
is consistent. Then Gödel's theorem yields that
by consistency of S (0) and Lemma 2. Thus no integer 0, 1, 2, · · · is the Gödel number of a proof of A p (0) (p ), and hence
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In this case, we can add A p (0) (p (0) ) as a new axiom of S (0) without introducing any contradiction. Namely, let S (1) be an extension of the formal system S (0) with an additional axiom A p (0) (p (0) ). Then by (5)
We now extend definitions 1 and 3 to the extended system S (1) as follows with noting that the numeralwise expressibility of the predicate A (1) (a, b) defined below can be extended to the new system S (1) with the same Gödel numbering as the one given in Lemma 1 for S (0) .
1) A
(1) (a, b) is a predicate meaning that "a is the Gödel number of a formula A(a), and b is the Gödel number of a proof of the formula A(a) in S (1) ."
2) Let p (1) be the Gödel number of a formula: ∀b¬A (1) (a, b) .
Then we have
= ∀b¬[a is the Gödel number of a formula A a (a), and b is the Gödel number of a proof of A a (a) in S (1) ].
By the extended numeralwise expressibility, we have in the way similar to the above by using the consistency (6) of S
Continuing the similar procedure with supposing at each step that the new system is ω-consistent, we get for any natural number n(≥ 0) that
We now let S (ω) the extended system of S
that includes all of the formulas A p (n) (p (n) ) as its axioms. We note that the formula
) is recursively defined if we have already constructed the system S (n) . Thus the addition of all A p (n) (p (n) ) retains the recursive definition of the following predicate A (ω) (a, b) defined in the same way as above.
is a predicate meaning that "a is the Gödel number of a formula A(a), and b is the Gödel number of a proof of the formula A(a) in S (ω) ."
Then we see that the predicate A (ω) (a, b) is numeralwise expressible in S (ω) and the Gödel number p
of the formula:
, is well-defined. As before, we continue the similar procedure, transfinite inductively, with assuming at each step that the obtained system is ω-consistent. In this process, we cannot reach the step where the number of added axioms is the cardinality C of continuum, as the number of added axioms is at most countable by the nature of formal system.
Thus we must have exhausted all of the formulas of the system S
intermediately in the transfinite process before we reach the α-th step with some ordinal α such that the cardinality ♯(α) of α satisfies
At that stage, if we could have added all formulas to the system S
without having any ω-inconsistency, then the obtained system is already inconsistent, a contradiction with our assumption that at each step we have obtained a consistent system. Thus the process must stop intermediately, which means that at some step we have gotten ω-inconsistency of a system S (β) for some ordinal β < α.
Summarizing we have proved
Theorem. Assume that S (0) is consistent. Suppose that for some ordinal α, C = ♯(α).
Then there is a countable ordinal β < α such that the system S (β) defined above is ω-inconsistent. Namely, there is a formula A(x) in S (β) such that the following holds:
⊢ A(0), ⊢ A(1), ⊢ A(2), · · · , ⊢ ¬∀xA(x).
